depending on how you view the state of cryptographic research, the results from this week are either very good or very bad. in the short term it probably means not much; in the slightly longer term it probably means we have a lot of replacing and upgrading to do.
this incident points out two facts:
- cryptography is an arms race and you need to keep spending money on it as long as your opponents are
- the ability to extend, augment, or replace algorithms in the field is an important feature for a security system
there will inevitably be an increase in pointers to henson's paper. beyond the preceding two points, the paper makes a valid argument that input or algorithm randomization can help turn permanent failure cases into transient ones. however, it extends these points, I think unfairly, into an attack against the whole concept of cryptographic hash functions (CHFs). that's a mistake, and really involves a lot of glossing over of what a CHF is and why we need them:
- difference detection is the principal task of data integrity
- humans can see big differences but not small differences
- the meaning of "big" and "small" can be changed, depending on the type of lens you use
- a CHF is a lens which enlarges some differences and shrinks others
- integrity systems should always use as many lenses as they can afford to
- working with "no lenses" is a meaningless concept: computers produce derived images of data all the time. even loading and storing bytes from memory is a copying operation, and there is always -- even with no attackers -- a certain probability that any bit in a string will flip.
- CHFs produce good value for the money: you spend a little bit of money on R&D, a little bit of CPU time calculating, and a little bit of disk space for storing; you get a lot of integrity. that's the equation.
I agree with the point about hash randomization, but tossing out CHFs as a concept is a serious mistake. coding theory, along with say binary search, is one of the exceedingly few sources of computers' Real Ultimate Power.