**Certs as an anti-spam system**

Let us say we wish to build an anti-spam system based on certifications. To make this work, we will need some method of authentication. (We can punt and make a public key be part of an identity). We also need some method of distributing all the certs widely, which must be resistant to attacks which selectively remove certs and anti-certs and also can handle the likely humongous size of the resulting database.

The above problems seem like work, but are much less of a concern than the problem of not having a cert graph evaluation algorithm which we find acceptable. As we can see from the Advogato example, even punting on all the engineering problems by centralizing everything still leaves an open problem as to whether a certification system can work well. Advogato is encouraging, but still immature.

I am now convinced that if we can come up with a certification evaluation primitive which meets the right criteria we will have a spam-fighting solution which will be work well, even if deployed on a global scale. I am furthur convinced that such a primitive exists, although I haven't figured out exactly how to do it yet.

Here are the criteria -

- There is a permissible spam factor, s. Say that a spammer has compromised k typical people in a well-connected graph. The spammer then proceeds to repeatedly send pieces of spam from either compromised people or fake people certified by compromised people. After each piece of spam is sent out, the recipient anti-certs the sender. The spammer never bothers sending mail which will be rejected because of the existing anti-certs. The anti-spam criterion states that the attacker should only be able to get about k*s pieces of spam accepted this way before almost any mail they try to send out will get rejected by the trust system.
- Let us say an attacker has k people compromised and wishes to use this power to censor others. Due to the anti-spam criterion, it must be possible for the attacker to censor at least k/s typical peers. The censorship criterion says they must not be able to censor any more than that.

Once we find a primitive which meets the above criteria, then we will be able to straightfaced claim to have plans for a global certification based anti-spam system which works on paper. Then we can start worrying about deployment problems.

**Partial busy-work functions**

I had an interesting thought while pondering circuit complexity today.

We have busy-work functions, which do little more than require some precisely tunable amount of time be spent computing them. For example, computing the secure hash of a sequence of x null characters. I wish to have a busy-work function, b, which meets some additional criteria criteria.

There are to be a fixed number of partial results we can compute each of which takes almost exactly k/2 time, where k is the total amount of busy work for the complete function. Each pair of partial results may be synergistic, meaning that given both of them you can compute b very quickly. Pairs of partial functions which are not synergistic should have the property that if you know both of them it still takes an additional k/2 time to compute b.

We wish to have a specific set of synergy relationships between partical functions. For example, we may want four partial functions P, Q, R, and S such that (P, Q), (Q, R), (P, R) and (R, S) are synergistic but all other pairs are not. My question is, for any given set of synergy relationships, is there always a b and related partial functions which has that property? Can you think of a way of putting together standard (or even not so standard) cryptographic primitives to make an implementation?

My intuition very strongly says that this is possible, but I don't immediately see a way of doing it.